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As companies seek protection from cyber attacks, justifying proper levels of investment 
in cyber security is essential. Like all investments, cyber defense costs must be weighed 
against their expected benefits.  
While some cyber investment models exist that can relate costs and benefits, these 
models are largely untested with experimental data. This research develops an 
experimental framework and statistics for testing and measuring the efficacy of cyber 
mitigation methods, such that they can be integrated into existing cyber investment 
models. 
This work surveys cyber security investment models and frameworks. Using 
cyber exercises as a source of attack data, types of exercises and how information is 
recorded was studied. 
A proof of concept for an experimental framework able to record statistics on 
cyber exercise attacks and defenses was developed. The environment is intended to 
resemble that of an actual cyber attack, and to collect attack and defense data in a 
repeatable and technology-agnostic manner. Possible future work could illuminate 
mathematical relationships between threat and mitigation. 
Statistics and procedures are proposed that are applicable to the specific proposed 
and similar frameworks. Such statistics could be incorporated into cyber models, 
ultimately leading to a more rational understanding of cyber attack and defense. 
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Many senior officials in the U.S. Government and private sector contend that the 
sustained, strategic, and surreptitious theft of America’s economic innovation could 
currently pose an existential threat to the economy and security of the United States 
(Rogers, 2011). As put by General Keith Alexander, the aggregate theft of American 
Intellectual property constitutes the “greatest transfer of wealth in history” (Rogin, 2012). 
While physical property is relatively secure, and the security of financial data has been 
made paramount, the intellectual property that fuels America’s economy remains highly 
vulnerable. In order to understand this current state of cyber defense, researchers must 
examine the decisions that network defenders make, and the information necessary to 
make those decisions in an informed manner.   
In order for senior leadership to make informed decisions, cyber defenders sorely 
need quantitative models and statistics. Real-world intrusion data is not readily available, 
nor will it become readily available in the near term. However, cyber defense exercises 
are free of much of the legal and classification restrictions of real intrusions, and can 
provide valuable data in a free, public, and standardized manner. The offensive and 
defensive tactics used during cyber exercises also mirror some of the procedures used in 
real world attacks. Therefore, exercises can serve as a risk-free proxy for data gathering; 
that data can then be used to feed cyber defense models, inform senior leadership 
decision-making, and further the understanding of the cybersecurity ecosystem. 
B. MOTIVATION 
In “Why Information Security is Hard,” Ross Anderson outlines some of the 
possible reasons for the current “state” of cybersecurity defense. He argues that the 
motivations, liabilities, and responsibilities of parties in cyberspace largely determine 
which actions are taken, and by whom, to secure their networks. He points to “The 
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Tragedy of the Commons” as an allegorical example of the issue of collective action (or 
lack thereof) in cybersecurity: 
If a hundred peasants graze their sheep on the village common, then 
whenever another sheep is added its owner gets almost the full benefit, 
while the other ninety-nine suffer only a small decline in the quality of the 
grazing. So they aren’t motivated to object, but rather to add another sheep 
of their own and get as much of the grazing as they can. The result is a 
dustbowl; and the solution is regulatory rather than technical. (Anderson, 
2001) 
The Tragedy of the Commons highlights the aggregated negative externalities of 
single actors’ self-interested actions. In cybersecurity, the issue is the same, but inverted: 
the lack of action on the part of a small fraction of companies to secure their networks 
makes everyone else more vulnerable. Citing Hal Varian’s 2000 NYTimes article, 
“Managing Online Security Risks” (Varian, 2000), Anderson argues that costs should be 
pushed to those “hosting” the malicious activity, so to speak. In the NYTimes, Varian 
puts it simply: “One reason that computer security is so poor in practice is that the 
liability is so diffuse.”  
Adding to the discussion of forces at play in cyberspace, Andrew Oldyzko 
examines the “Economics, Psychology, and Sociology of Security” in his paper by the 
same name (Odlyzko, 2003). He touches on some of the economic motivations cited by 
Anderson, writing “security does not come for free, and so it is necessary to look at the 
tradeoffs between costs and benefits. Furthermore, it is necessary to look at the incentives 
of various players, as many have an interest in passing on the costs of security to others, 
or of using security for purposes such as protecting monopolies.” This highlights the 
importance of organizational and human interests behind decisions in the cyber defense 
realm. Furthermore, he believes the formal structures are, on paper, incomplete, writing: 
“Our commercial, government, and academic enterprises are large organizations with 
many formal rules and regulations. Yet the essential workings of these enterprises are 
typically based on various social relations and unwritten rules.” While technology and 
systems may have certain expected behaviors in a vacuum, the real performance of these 




In “Cyber Information-Sharing Models: An Overview” (The MITRE Corporation, 
2012), researchers at MITRE argue that the current state of affairs in information sharing 
is a contributing factor to the poor state of cyber defense. They write that “a key element 
in defending against [cyber] attacks is having information about the tools, techniques and 
resources (physical, financial, and human) that adversaries are using to breach cyber 
defenses.” The argument here is that even with the right motivations, defense 
technologies, and security procedures in place, many organizations may simply lack the 
information they need to defend themselves.  
These examples illustrate that there is much more to the cybersecurity problem 
that just poor cryptography or out-of-date AV signatures. There are large-scale economic, 
sociological, and information dissemination/translation issues at play, and these issues 
may not be addressed singly through technologies, policies, or legislation. Rather, it is 




Though no domain or criminal area is quite like cyberspace, a discussion of 
cybersecurity models can be framed by existing paradigms. Perhaps the first 
macroeconomic paradigm that comes to mind is that of physical-world crime. Criminal 
economics has been studied for centuries, and many models exist, from narcotics to bank 
robbery to auto theft. If focused on cybercrime, these models may yield useful 
frameworks and bring researchers closer to understanding the mechanics and strategies of 
the cyber cartels. However, the existing criminal models are still largely rooted in the 
physical world, and thus may not account for the distributed and instantaneous nature of 
cyberspace. 
Second is a military offense/defense model. Counting “good guys” on one side 
and “bad guys” on the other may help us define who is currently “winning.” This model, 
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too, is rooted in geography and may not correctly weigh the impact of small-scale issues, 
instead focusing on high-profile events and advanced capabilities. 
A third paradigm to model cybersecurity is that of public health. Medical based 
models, specifically for infectious disease, exhibit the speed and networked environment 
of cyberspace. They also take into account the effect of mitigation measures on a 
population, including possible second-and third level after effects. Additionally, public 
health model demonstrates the interchangeable nature of threats and mitigations. That is, 
a given mitigation can be used to treat or deter a variety of threats. Finally, public health 
also shares the distributed and simultaneous nature of cyber defense—a given threat can 
strike a number of victims all around the same time, requiring rapid response and 
information sharing.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In order to make a rational argument for cybersecurity investment, organizations 
must first ask whether cyber breaches present a real cost to the organization. Next, they 
may ask if insuring against those losses is a better solution versus actually trying to 
prevent them in the first place. Finally, if they do believe that the costs are worth 
preventing, and that insurance does not present a viable option, they must ask which 
measures to take, and what the expected benefits of those measures are. In order to make 
this assessment objectively, firms need to be able to perform a cost-benefit analysis of 
cyber security investments and measures. To do so, they must have an understanding of 
the expected benefits of cyber mitigation measures, as well as the expected cost of not 
applying those measures. Without this data, firms may not be able to empirically justify 
proactive cybersecurity investments.   
However, this data is hard to find. Even if available, it is often not standardized. 
And lastly, it usually applies to a more macro understanding of the incident, rather than 
the specific tactics used by both offense and defense during  an intrusion. While these 
details may not concern senior leadership, they do form the foundation of understanding 
cyber attacks and mitigations. That understanding can then inform strategic models and 
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decisions. Without this understanding, however, leaders are left to a theoretical 
expectation, or best guess estimate for their investments. 
In kinetic warfare and physical crime, real-world simulations are understandably 
tricky. You cannot fully use real weapons in a wargame, and you cannot fire real bullets 
in a police exercise. In cyber, however, you can - and you can do it over and over again. 
For example, it is possible to build an environment which closely resembles a business 
network, complete with Windows domains, a DMZ network, routers, firewalls and other 
elements. This network can be attacked, infiltrated and destroyed  without any real harm 
to real-world networks or operations. Using virtual machines, it can be rebuilt and done 
all over again. Cyber exercises, which already exist in many forms, thus present an 
untapped resource of cyber attack and defense statistics; we simply have not been 
collecting them properly. If efforts can be made to capture and standardize statistics 
during cyber exercises, the aggregate dataset could be used to build and test and model a 
myriad of scenarios. 
D. APPROACH 
This thesis project involves the development of a cyber exercise methodology in 
which a single user, two users, or classroom could create, gather, and standardize cyber 
attack and defense statistics. The objective is to develop a standardized exercise 
framework to gather statistics in a technology-agnostic manner. The exercise will be used 
to inform and test the statistics. While in theory, some statistics may make logical sense, 
if they cannot actually be collected and analyzed from an exercise, then they will not be 
usable in cyber investment calculations. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis assumes certain understanding of cyber security terms and concepts, as 
well as concepts used in mathematics and statistics. It is limited mainly by budget, hence 
the use of mainly open source and unsupported software in the creation of the attack lab. 
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The thesis project will be comprised of the discussion of cyber metrics and 
models, the reasons for using cyber exercise data to test those models, and finally the 
creation and testing of an experimental cyber attack framework.  
While knowledge of cyber attack and defense methodologies is informed by real 
operational experience from US-CERT cases, all the data in this thesis is unclassified and 
fabricated in a lab environment. The tools and exploits used herein are seen and used in 
real-world environments.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides background on existing cyber models and metrics. Chapter III 
provides the criteria for qualifying cyber exercises as a source of real statistical data. 
Chapter IV outlines the construction of the exercise environment, execution of a test 
exercise, and the results of data collection. Chapter V summarizes findings and proposes 
future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND—EXISTING CYBER MODELS  
A. THE COST OF FAILURE 
In a recently published Forrester Research Paper, “Determine The Business Value 
of An Effective Security Program —Information Security Economics 101,” Ed Ferrara 
argues that “To fully understand security’s financial impact on the organization, CISOs 
should understand all the various costs of protecting information. This includes the fixed 
costs as well as variable costs, especially those related to breaches” (Ferrara, 2002). 
1. Stock Market Returns 
One rather obvious—and elegant—method to measure the cost of a cybersecurity 
breach in the private sector is, simply, to measure the stock market impact of breach 
announcements. This is precisely what Katherine Campbell et al. studied in 2003. 
(Katherine Campbell, 2003) In the study, the researchers found “an overall negative stock 
market reaction to public announcements of information security breaches.” This is 
largely unsurprising news; however, Campbell further note, “We find a highly significant 
negative market reaction for information security breaches involving unauthorized access 
to confidential data, but no significant reaction when the breach does not involve 
confidential information.” Thus, the nature of the breach, in the eyes of investors, does 
appear to affect the market cost. 
An associated study was performed by Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou in 2011 
(Lawrence A. Gordon, 2011). The authors note conflicting studies since the 2003 study, 
saying, “several researchers have studied the impact of [cyber] breaches on the stock 
market returns of firms. The results from these studies, however, have been mixed.” Thus, 
Gordon et al. used a more “sophisticated market model over a long period and over two 
distinct and naturally arising sub-periods,” and in this study, attempted to “resolve 
conflicting evidence from previous studies concerning the effect of information security 
breaches.” (Lawrence A. Gordon, 2011). Their findings supported their earlier thoughts, 
that “…news about information security breaches (where such breaches are treated as a 
generic category) had a statistically significant effect on the stock returns of publicly 
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traded firms.” This appears to suggest, at least, that cyber breaches, in fact, can cause a 
very real negative financial impact to firms.   
The 2011 stock-return analysis above also noted an interesting phenomenon: an 
apparent decrease in the market effect of a breach—namely, that breaches before 9/11 
cost more to the stock market performance of a firm than breaches after 9/11 did. Since 
the breaches themselves had little other differences, human perception likely has much to 
do with this. Put by Gordon et al., “there seems to a shift in the attitude among investors 
toward viewing information security breaches as creating a corporate “nuisance” (or 
merely another recurring operating cost) rather than creating a potentially serious 
economic threat to the survival of firms.” If cyber breaches are, indeed, viewed as an 
“operating cost” in today’s environment, that may give private sector leaders some 
relief—after all, negative events can be covered by insuring against them.   
2. Cyber Insurance 
Despite its seemingly logical place in the cybersecurity field, cyber insurance has 
so far failed to provide a mature, widely accepted framework for insuring against cyber 
risk. In “Aegis, A Novel Cyber Insurance Model,” for example, Pal, Golubchik and 
Psounis propose a new quantitative model for cyber insurance, but also concede that their 
model, the Aegis framework,”also faces problems [related to] interdependent security.” 
(Pal, Golubchik, & Psounis, 2011). They are essentially saying that the fundamental 
interdependence of assets in cyberspace, among other things, currently limits the 
application of their cyber insurance model. That is not to say that the problem is 
intractable: Rainer Bohme and Gaurav Kataria attempt to model correlation in “Models 
and Measures for Correlation in Cyber-Insurance.” In this study, they find that because of 
the high degree of interdependence present in cyberspace, “our simulation results indicate 
that cyber-insurance is best suited for classes of risk with high internal and low global 
correlation,” that is, companies or assets which have minimal externalities. Additionally, 
they cite a lack of good empirical data with which to test their findings, suggesting that as 
a direction for future work. (Kataria, 2006) 
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In their 2010 paper, “Modeling Cyber-Insurance: Towards A Unifying 
Framework” (Bohme & Schwartz, 2010), Rainer, Bohm, and Schwartz examine various 
cyber-insurance models, noting the relatively disappointing prospects in the cyber 
insurance market: “Even a conservative forecast of 2002, which predicted a global 
market for cyber-insurance worth $2.5 billion in 2005, turned out to be five times higher 
than the size of the market in 2008 (three years later). Overall, in relative terms, the 
market for cyber-insurance shrank as the Internet economy grew.” The authors note also 
that this weak cyber insurance market is often attributed to a lack of understanding: “The 
observable under-development of the market for cyber-insurance is often attributed to 
insurers’ lack of experience with a new kind of risk, combined with insufficient actuarial 
data hindering competitive pricing.” Thus, it is difficult for insurance providers to 
determine what insurance should cost, because of a lack of objective data informing the 
expected loss of a cyber event. This “lack of actuarial data,” as will be seen later, is not 
just missing in insurance models—it is indeed the missing piece in the cost/benefit model 
of cybersecurity investment. 
B. MEASURING BENEFITS 
1. The Gordon-Loeb Model 
In 2002, University of Maryland Professors Lawrence Gordon and Martin Loeb 
developed a popular model for objectively evaluating investment benefit. The model 
takes an inductive, logical approach towards arriving at a final assessment of investment 
benefit. Essentially, the equation which Gordon and Loeb developed measures the 
economic benefit of information security as the difference between money spent on the 
investment itself, and the marginal decrease in expected loss due to the protection 
provided by the investment. Measuring the cost of the investment is relatively 
straightforward—it is simply the cost of whatever people, products, and technology are 
part of the cybersecurity investment. The impact of the investment, on the other hand, 
depends on the computed decrease in vulnerability. This is harder to measure inductively. 
Placing a baseline number on a system’s objective vulnerability is not easy, and no 
common, widely-used scale currently exists. However, the Gordon-Loeb model only asks 
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for the difference in vulnerability, before and after the security investment is made. That 
difference then informs the change in expected loss, assuming a static economic value 
assigned to the vulnerable asset. As put in their paper, “the key to analyzing information 
security decisions is not the vulnerability (or the expected loss without the investment), 
but the reduction in expected loss with the investment.” Thus, the Gordon-Loeb model 
elegantly simplifies the economic decision to one bit of information; the decrease in 
expected loss. This, however, is where the model fails; it plugs in arbitrary vulnerability 
functions without any real explanation as to why these relationships exist. In order to 
complete this model, true relationships between vulnerability and mitigation must be built 
and justified. 
2. Empirical Analysis 
Historical empirical analysis has been tried. Liu, Tanaka, and Matsuura present “a 
two-step empirical analysis of investing in security countermeasures based on a Japanese 
enterprise survey of security investments in the private sector (Liu, Tanaka, & Matsuura). 
The first step measured the vulnerability of Japanese enterprise by examining the change 
in reported computer virus incidents reported to the Japanese government between 2002 
and 2003, and then examining which companies on both lists made significant 
cybersecurity investments. The study was made possible largely due to the mandatory 
reporting requirements of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), and survey data gathered from Japanese enterprises. The study found that 
significant investments in security protections (“countermeasures”) did indeed lead to a 
decrease in computer virus incidents. Persistent, or targeted threats may not have been 
affected. While only as good as the survey information provided, this study does provide 
an empirical test of the Gordon Loeb model and as such lays the groundwork for future 
study.  
Another, more mathematical examination of the Gordon-Loeb model, performed 
by Jan Willemson (Willemson, 2006), frames the need for a further fleshing out of the 
relationship between investment and vulnerability: “In [their model], Gordon and Loeb 
considered two specific function families, but actually there is no reason to assume that 
any function in any of these families corresponds to any real vulnerability decrease 
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scenario. Thus, the main direction for further work is to look for functions reflecting 
changes in vulnerability for some real situations.” The “further work” to which 
Willemson is referring is precisely the work necessary to test cyber investment models, 
and thus inform decisions at the boardroom level.  
Such a test of the Gordon-Loeb model would require an experimental framework, 
capable of isolating the variables inherent in a cybersecurity event, so that data points can 
be gathered, and possible correlations could be drawn. From this data, one may be able to 
build a continuous relationship between vulnerability and mitigation, specific to 
particular attack vectors. This relationship would fill out the Gordon-Loeb model, and 
given company-specific assessments of asset valuations, a more informed cost-benefit 
equation could be derived.   
The investigation into the reasons behind cybersecurity investment thus begins 
with viewing the problem as the aggregate of independent, self-interested decisions by 
firms. From there, one can assess the various models which may apply—in this case, the 
Gordon-Loeb model. Understanding the firm’s decision process first requires assessment 
of the real cost of a breach. Additionally, one must examine non-investment options such 
as insurance. If investment is a choice, it must then be financially justified. Such a 
justification model exists in Gordon-Loeb, but it is missing a critical element: the 
relationship between vulnerability and cyber investment. However, this relationship is not 
currently possible to objectively ascertain with publicly available intrusion information. 
Moreover, it is highly likely that there are many such relationships specific to particular 
vulnerabilities and mitigations—as put by Willemson: “clearly, such functions are 
strongly application area specific.” Therefore, a plausible, and productive way forward in 
modeling private sector cyber investment decisions is to arm firms with objective, 
empirical data. If mathematical relationships between vulnerabilities and mitigations can 
be derived, that would further fill out the model. This is a critical missing piece in 
understanding the fundamental economic mechanics of the cyber ecosystem. 
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C. WHERE IS THE DATA? 
Many people would agree that cyber security is a data-rich environment, but 
much of the real-world data resides in disparate corners of the private sector, academia, 
and can also possibly be classified by government agencies. Additionally, even if that 
data can be shared it is only useful in statistically significant amounts, and when it is 
normalized, formatted, and sensible.  
This likely has much to do with the legal environment surrounding cyber 
incidents. While companies have become increasingly open about their intrusions in 
recent years, they do not share network diagrams, log statistics, or mitigation plans with 
the public, and for good reason. The details of a corporate breach involve proprietary and 
personal information, and as such remain protected. The process of sanitizing cyber 
attack data to exclude these sensitive details is very labor intensive, and organizations 
may not be able to justify dedicating resources to that effort, especially since it has little 
to do with addressing the problem at hand. Moreover, the tools and technologies 
deployed within an organization’s network often belong to third party companies, and 
exposing the failure of those systems may similarly cause legal and contractual issues for 
companies. Most corporate press releases are limited to general dates and figures 
regarding the breach, as well as customer-designed guidance on protection from identity 
theft or fraudulent activities.  
This state of affairs results in droves of anecdotes, third party stories, and rumors, 
but very little in the way of useful statistics. Not to mention, in many cases it is safe to 
assume that the victim company may still not fully understand the full nature of the 
breach, nor the preliminary measures taken by attackers. Therefore, even in the most 
verbose incident reporting, the data is still limited by the visibility and understanding of 
the reporting entity. 
1. Existing Metrics 
Several cyber metrics systems exist for recording real-world intrusion events—
such as Verizon’s VERIS framework (Verizon, 2014), the SANS Security Metrics (Payne, 
2006),or the NIST standards for Incident Reporting (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & 
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Scarfone, 2012), but very few standard metrics have yet been widely adopted to record 
and compare cyber actions taken during events. Therefore, it is nearly impossible for 
researchers at separate organizations to analyze the same data set from two different 
angles. With the exception of open-source projects like Project Honeypot (UnSpam 
Technologies, 2014), the HoneyNet Project (Project, 2014), and others, publicly available 
standardized cyber attack data is surprisingly scarce and rarely interoperable. 
2. Exercises Hold Untapped Data 
Cyber Exercises, especially those of a Red/Blue Team nature, have the potential 
to give researchers a “bird’s eye view” into a cyber attack. In almost all Red/ Blue team 
competitions, there is a White Team, or control team, which can change the situation on 
the fly to serve the objectives of the exercise. This team operates with omniscience and 
full awareness of the actions of both blue and red teams. If the data available to the white 
team could be recorded and indexed, it would provide the otherwise elusive visibility 
which does not exist in real-world intrusions, a perspective not subject to the biases or 
limits of either defender or attacker. The data would simply tell the story. 
Additionally, the frequency and diversity of cyber exercises in recent years could 
potentially cover a wide variety of attack methods, mitigations, and technologies. If taken 
in aggregate over several years, just the range and frequency of cyber exercises could 
cover the most common attack methodologies. Since the attack and defense types are as 
diverse as the systems and configurations which comprise the cyber security ecosystem, 
it is also essential that simple, standard, technology-agnostic metrics be built which can 
apply to all cyber exercise situations. Similar to a batting average in baseball, these 
metrics must be universally usable and comparable across all exercises. 
In order to yield useful information for real-world decisions, it is imperative that 
the exercise simulates a real-world situation as closely as possible, and that the statistics 
gathered are standardized and repeatable. The following section will examine cyber 
exercises and cyber attack methodologies, and propose criteria for the design of the 
proof-of-concept exercise.  
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III. EXERCISE METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
CONSIDERATIONS  
A. CYBER ATTACK METHODOLOGY 
In the “Hacking Exposed” series of publications written by Stuart McClure, 
George Kurtz, and Joel Scambray, the “Anatomy of a Hack” chart appears on the inside 
of the back cover. Hacking Exposed 7th edition, for example, has the following steps, 





4 Gaining Access 
5 Pilfering 
6 Covering Tracks 
7 Creating Back Doors 
8 Denial of Service 
Table 1. Hacking Exposed “Anatomy of a Hack” (from Scambray, McClure, & 
Kurtz, 2012) 
While various iterations of this methodology have developed since Hacking 
Exposed’s First Edition, the “Anatomy of a Hack” provides a useful framework for 
discussing the phases of any cyber intrusion. More importantly for the purposes of this 
discussion, these modules can be used to group the myriad tactics and techniques within 
the cyber exercise universe. However, Hacking Exposed was written before much of the 
industry began focusing on the “Advanced Persistent Threat,” or “APT” style of attack, 
which often  incorporates client-side exploitation and lateral movement (Symantec, 2014). 
Operations like these have been described in a collection of cyber research papers, from 
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the Mandiant APT1 report published in February 2013 (Mandiant, 2013), to the 
Elderwood Project paper published by Symantec in 2012 (O'Gorman & McDonald, 2012), 
back to the Shady RAT and Night Dragon reports published by McAfee in 2011 (McAfee, 
2011) (Alperovitch, 2011). These types of intrusions center around movement and 
persistence within a compromised network, and eventual exfiltration of sensitive data. 
These operations can be mostly described using elements of the Hacking Exposed 
Anatomy.  
To further supplement this categorization, however, the following life cycle 
included in the Mandiant APT1 report provides further modules and the idea of an 
internal loop in the methodology, shown in Table 2: 
 
1 Initial Recon 
2 Initial Compromise 






5 Complete Mission 
Table 2.  Mandiant APT1 Methodology 
Reportedly, many operations have targeted companies and organizations in the 
U.S. housing intellectual property central to their business model. Therefore, to provide 
data relevant to the problem noted in Chapter I, the design of a simulation exercise should 
follow the basic framework of these real-world APT intrusions. The next section briefly 
describes  general categories of cyber exercises, and how to tailor an exercise more 
closely to an APT-style attack. 
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B. CYBER EXERCISE FRAMEWORKS 
Cyber competitions have matured and diversified greatly in the last two decades. 
(Eller, 2004) Currently, most cyber exercises can be placed into four major categories, 
shown below: 
Current Models of Cyber Exercises 
 Disaster Response/ Coordination 
 Capture the Flag- Race 
 Capture the Flag - Battle Royale 
 Vulnerability Discovery vs. Remediation 
 Red vs. Blue 
a. Disaster Response and Coordination 
These cyber “exercises” most closely resemble physical disaster response 
exercises, and are often performed on a regional or national scale. The Cyber Storm 
series of cyber exercises, for example, follow this model (Department of Homeland 
Security, n.d.) 
b. Capture the Flag–Race 
These are Capture-The Flag competitions in which teams are given points based 
off how many “flags” they capture, on a neutral system. The event is timed and there is 
minimal inter-team activity. All teams are essentially attacking the same system, and the 
fastest team to capture all the flags wins. Points can also be deducted for hints or help, 
affecting the aggregate score (Symantec, 2014; The National Cyber League, 2013). 
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c. Capture the Flag—Battle Royale 
In this scenario, teams try to capture flags which reside on other teams’ networks, 
while defending their own. This incorporates both attack and defense, usually in a live-
fire exercise. Figure 1 is an example of the “Defcon”-style exercise:  
 
 
Figure 1. Defcon-Style Capture-the-Flag, (from Cowan, Arnold, Beattie, Wright, & 
Viega, 2003) 
Another example of a Battle Royale-style exercise is the now-defunct Cipher CTF, 
which employed symmetric competition as well as functionality requirements. A 
description of the exercise, taken from the Cipher CTF website, is below: 
The exercise consists of multiple teams, each hosting a server that has 
multiple services running, like e.g., a webserver, a mail server, or 
customized services. The services contain typical security vulnerabilities 
that allow to compromise the server to a certain exten[t]. The goal is to 
maintain the services up, functional and uncompromised for the duration 
of the game. Additional scores can be gained by patching the 
vulnerabilities of the services and exploiting the knowledge of the found 
weaknesses at the other team’s servers. (Pimendis, 2010) 
It should be noted above that the Cipher CTF incorporates a functionality 
requirement, ensuring that network defenders do not lock down the network to the point 
of making it unusable. This is an important aspect of any real-world simulation, because 
it replicates—even if only to small extent—the pressures that network defenders deal 




Looking for req. services
If all services found,
Score one point for the
Flag currently on that
node
… while each team
tries to replace others’ flags
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d. Vulnerability Discovery vs. Remediation 
In some cyber defense competitions, points are awarded to teams that can identify 
and remediate vulnerabilities first, and provide a proof that the vulnerability is fixed. 
While this is an important aspect of blue-team system and network hardening prior to an 
incident, it reveals little about incident response capability (Air Force Association, 2013) 
(DARPA, 2014). 
e. Red vs. Blue 
In this model, one red team is tasked with attacking one blue team network. The 
goal is often the access to or exfiltration of sensitive data. Points are often awarded to the 
Red team for certain “flags,” or tasks they have to accomplish. While some “hacking 
back” may be seen from the blue team, the blue team’s main objective is simply to hold 
off the red team for as long as possible until the exercise ends. 
Therefore, the exercise type that most closely simulates APT activity against the 
U.S. private sector and civilian government is the Red/Blue design, for several reasons. 
Active Threat—Most Red/ Blue team exercises involve human beings on both 
sides—hence a continual active threat, and active, aware defense. This most closely 
resembles the conditions of APT intrusions, where malicious actions are thought to be 
mostly done manually. 
Functionality Requirements—In a Red/ Blue team exercise, the Blue Team is 
defending a simulated “real network.” This often involves networks with an expected 
functionality, not simply a test range. Thus, various services and protocols must be open, 
for business to occur. This also closely resembles many private and public sector 
networks, where functionality often trumps security. 
Exfiltration Goal—Finally, Red vs. Blue Team exercises often involve a 
Confidentiality or Integrity compromise—the type of compromise about which many 
companies are concerned when it comes to APT actors. That goal determines much of the 
pace and mitigations steps of a blue team, versus, say destructive malware or DDoS. 
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C. CONDITIONS OF THE PROPOSED EXERCISE FRAMEWORK 
The “Storyline” of the proposed exercise framework follows a blend of the 
Hacking Exposed and Mandiant APT1 methodologies, with discrete steps toward 
achievement of exfiltration of sensitive data. Additionally, the exercise should be 
constructed to allow for the Red Team to succeed initial compromise, with minimal, but 
necessary, assistance by the White cell. This helps the exercise to test cyber defense 
capabilities, and not solely pre-configuration or defensive hardening abilities on the part 
of the blue team.  
a. Baseline User Activity/ Traffic  
Real-World networks are dominated by “civilians”—meaning it is not just red and 
blue team members. Much of cyber defense is finding malicious activity within large 
amounts of “legitimate” traffic. Having White Team members pretend to be legitimate 
“users” on the network is one way to accomplish this. There are several open-source 
network traffic simulators available, and these could be used to create the signal/noise 
ratio in the exercise environment. 
b. Intelligence/ Threat Information 
Prior to any attack, real-world cyber defense teams may likely have some 
understanding of the threats they face—actors and attack vectors. Beginning any exercise 
with some basic threat intelligence would help simulate real-world scenarios and give the 
blue team a way to prioritize resource allocation. 
c. Blue Team Resources/ Functionality Requirements 
During an attack, some have argued that the blue team should just unplug the 
network. In real-world scenarios, this is rarely an option. Blue teams have to keep the 
network to an acceptable level of functionality, or at least pay a penalty for degraded 
performance for legitimate users. This was incorporated, for example, into the above-
mentioned Cipher CTF exercise. Additionally, the blue team cannot have unlimited 
monitoring, storage, or analysis resources. These constraints will then help emulate the 
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real-world decisions that cyber defenders face—decisions which are the very foundation 
of effective defense and incident response. 
d. Preexisting Configurations 
Few cyber defense teams get to build their systems from the ground up. If 
possible, blue teams should defend systems from an existing state while keeping core 
functionalities running. This best simulates real-world scenarios where security analysts 
and leaders inherit the existing vulnerabilities on their network, and work to fix those as 
best they can. Even more so for cyber-incident response teams, who may know very little 
about the customer network before asked to come on site. 
e. Real-World Duration 
Cyber defenders are already busy enough. It is hard to find time to do training, 
and thus many exercises are constrained to within a week or two. Given this real-world 
time constraint, it can be difficult to simulate an APT campaign, or even a criminal cyber 
attack, which may in reality happen over months—or years in some APT cases. 
f. Scope 
Depending on the exercise architect, the contested network must be scoped. While 
large-scale intrusions may take place on networks with thousands of machines, exercises 
typically operate at several orders of magnitude lower. To replicate the internal network 
of even a medium-sized corporation would require hundreds of machines, licenses, and 
infrastructure devices, which most classroom environments may not have. Instead, 
exercises should seek to use representations; a handful of desktop/laptop machines, for 
example, can effectively represent a 1000+ machine user environment.  
g. Provide Avenue for Initial Compromise 
With an advanced and persistent threat, eventual initial compromise of some asset 
is all but guaranteed. Sooner or later, a vulnerable system (known or unknown) will be 
exploited. A user will click on a link or open an attachment. A USB drive will be plugged 
into a system. A vulnerable web server will be promoted into production, or a zero-day 
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exploit will bypass even the best security team. Focusing on prevention is futile—what is 
important is early detection, resilience, and eradication before sensitive data can be stolen. 
h. Provide Avenues to Move Laterally/ Establish Persistence 
Once inside the network, APT actors will often utilize preexisting infrastructure to 
move laterally –using legitimate accounts, file shares, etc.  These methods are precisely 
the same tools and technologies that legitimate users utilize, and as such they must 
remain enabled for the exercise. This speaks to the blue team’s baseline functionality 
requirements; they cannot simply shut down the basic functions of the network, but rather 
must find the anomalous behavior in logs and artifacts. 
i. Timing 
To allow for full activities on both sides, but also a full ability to log and record 
results, an exercise could contain three phases, each entailing several steps. An example 
phase breakout is below in Table 3, using the various modules from the Hacking Exposed 












Table 3. Phases of Offense 
If conditions such as those noted above can be created in a classroom 
environment, then the actions and reactions of an exercise in that environment can 
provide a reasonable simulation for actual cyber incidents. The following chapter will 
describe the topological, technical, and temporal aspects of a, localized, easy to replicate 
“One Man” exercise, as well as a classroom-setting Red vs. Blue Exercise, both of which 
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should resemble real-world intrusions. These will not only provide models for educating 
cyber defenders, but also for gathering statistics for use in cyber modeling efforts. These 
statistics will need to be standardized, repeatable, and granular enough to allow for 
multiple combinations and derivative statistics in future studies. 
D. STATISTICAL MEASURES 
1. Indicators and Infrastructure 
 The statistics are intended to measure how effective the Blue Team’s detection 
efforts were against the Red Team’s infrastructure. These can be broken down by attack 





















Table 4  Team-Based Measures and Statistics 
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2. Tool-Based Statistics  
 These statistics are meant for network defenders to evaluate which tools helped 
the most during a given exercise. Over the course of many exercises, these aggregate 
statistics will show which tools are usually among the most effective for network 



















Table 5.  Tool-Based Measures and Statistics 
E. INCORPORATING STATISTICS INTO CYBER INVESTMENT MODEL 
Hypothetically, for every APT exfiltration attack, there is a probability, at any 
given time, that it will either succeed or not. The job of the security administrator is to 
minimize the probability of a successful exfiltration. To do so, the security team uses 
detections and mitigations. 
1. Evaluating Alerting Technologies – Theory 
Whether at the network or host level, cyber defense technologies exist to detect, 
alert, and block badness from occurring. Ideally, a cyber defense technology would detect 
all malicious indicators within its purview, and only the malicious ones (zero false 
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positives). Additionally, the technology would not miss any malicious activities (zero 
false negatives). In order to circumvent this, attackers seek to bypass, obfuscate, or 
change their infrastructure.  
Rather than trying to build an objective measure of benefit from the ground up, 
this approach allows an aggregate of attackers to empirically determine which 
technologies and procedures have the greatest impact to their operations. The benefit of a 
security asset is then by definition its negative effect on offensive operations. 
For an attacker to make steps forward in their operation, they must use 
infrastructure. Infrastructure has a chance of setting off alerts, which can provide 
indicators to the blue team. The blue team then can remove some percentage of the 
necessary infrastructure from the red team. In order to fully prevent the red team from 
moving forward (a “block”) the blue team must detect and mitigate all infrastructure in 
that step, assuming perfect detection (no false positives) and full infrastructure 
enumeration (all infrastructure identified).   
Theoretically, an attacker has a 0% chance of achieving his or her goal if all their 
offensive infrastructure is discovered. This includes external IP address space they may 
use as a jump point, and malware and exploits at their disposal, but also the “internal 
infrastructure” gained after initial compromise. This includes stolen account credentials 
and internal points of presence, for example. As a cyber defender, it is crucial to find and 
eliminate this infrastructure, or at least take it away from the attacker. Thus, the share of 
prevention belonging to any one technology can be reasonably measured by the 
percentage of actor infrastructure that a given technology is responsible for finding. As 
will be shown later, this approach can also be tailored to penalize for false positives and 
false negatives. Measuring the effectiveness of a technology is, in mathematical terms, to 
measure the intersection between Set A (actor threat infrastructure) and Set B (all 
technology-discovered indicators). When applied to a controlled exercise, the expected 
benefit of a technology can be viewed as the sum of all infrastructure enumerated during 
the exercise. This is the net impact that this technology could have potentially had on the 
adversary, assuming a perfect security team. The next section breaks down the terms and 
calculation of this metric. 
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2. Properties of Indicators 
For each indicator “I” provided by a given technology, there are the following 
properties: 
1. Appearances of “I” in total number of records generated by technology, and; 
2. Percentage of similar infrastructure available to adversary. 
For an example of the first, take an IP address detected by an IDS during a scan. 
The IP address appears in 5% of the alerts. While the technology obviously believes 
something is awry, most alerts require validation and examination for false positives. In 
order to evaluate the technology independently of human beings or skillset, this metric 
assumes a random choice of any alert as an indicator. In this case, there is a 5% chance 
that this indicator would be randomly chosen out of all alerts.  
With regards to the second, it is also important to properly weight the relative 
importance of a given indicator. For example, if the network administrator blocks an IP 
address, but the actor has 10 similar IPs available from which they can scan, the 
administrator has only eliminated 10% of the problem. Thus, the expected benefit of this 
indicator is the chance of discovering it in logs times the marginal impact it has on the 
active adversary infrastructure. As another example, if a malicious file is found on a host 
machine, but there are 10 such infections, the administrator has only removed 10% of the 
problem. 
3. Implementation Into a Simplified Gordon-Loeb Model 
Remember that the Gordon-Loeb model makes the reasonable assertion that 
Expected Benefit of Information Security (EBIS) Investment is equal to the expected 
change in loss due to a breach. Assuming an APT-style data exfiltration scenario, the cost 
of a data breach can be estimated by the intellectual property valuation of the data that 
stands to be stolen. That is: 
 
EBIS = P(s)*Worth of Asset 
Equation 1.  Simplified Gordon-Loeb 
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This P(S) can be substituted by a metric called “Detection Impact.” For a given 
technology, Detection Impact is measured as the signal to noise ratio of the technology 
combined with the impact of the indicators the technology discovers. 
What this looks like, mathematically, is: 
4. Detection Impact 
For all Indicators I1, I2, I3, etc generated by a given Technology T, the technology 
has an aggregate impact on the adversary’s ability to complete their mission. If there are 
three technologies TA, TB, and TC, each responsible for discrete, mutually exclusive 
indicators: 
TA: IA1, IA2, IA3 
TB: IB1, IB2, IB3, IB4 
TC: IC1, IC2 
 
Then the Detection Impact of Technology A, represented by D(TA) is equal to the below: 
ܦሺ ஺ܶሻ ൌ෍ሺࡿ࢏ࢍ࢔ࢇ࢒	࢚࢕	ࡺ࢕࢏࢙ࢋ		ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕	࢕ࢌ	ࡵ࢔ࢊ࢏ࢉࢇ࢚࢕࢘	ࡵ࡭࢔ሻ ൈ ሺࡵ࢔ࢊ࢏ࢉࢇ࢚࢕࢘	ࢃࢋ࢏ࢍࢎ࢚	ࡲࢇࢉ࢚࢕࢘
௡
ሻ 
Equation 2.  Detection Impact 
Signal to Noise Ratio for Each Indicator” is calculated as:  
ܶݎݑ݁	ܲ݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁	ܣ݈݁ݎݐݏ	ܩ݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݁݀	ܥ݋݊ܽݐܽ݅݊݅݊݃	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ	ܫ
ܣ݈݈	ܣ݈݁ݎݐݏ	ܩ݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݁݀	ܾݕ	݄ܶ݁ܿ݊݋݈݋݃ݕ	ܶ  
Equation 3.  Indicator Signal To Noise Ratio 
The Weighting Factor represents the share of like actor infrastructure that an 
indicator represents. For example, if the attackers have 3 exploits available, and the 




Equation 4  Indicator Weight Factor 
 
∑ ቂ ሺ஺௟௘௥௧௦	ீ௘௡௘௥௔௧௘ௗ	௖௢௡௧௔௜௡௜௡௚	ூ௡ௗ௜௖௔௧௢௥	ூሻሺ்௢௧௔௟	ே௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	஺௟௘௥௧௦	ீ௘௡௘௥௔௧௘ௗ	஻௬	்௢௢௟ሻቃ 	ൈ ሾ
ଵ
ே௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௅௜௞௘	ூ௡௙௥௔௦௧௥௨௖௧௨௥௘	௔௧	஺௧௧௔௖௞௘௥ᇲ௦	஽௜௦௣௢௦௔௟ሿ	   
Equation 5  Breakout of Detection Impact 
As an example of how the summation works, suppose a technology detects three 
indicators. The calculation of the Detection Impact is in Table 6. 
 
   Indicator 1  Indicator 2  Indicator 3  Total 
True Positive  20 15 17  52 
Total Alerts  100 100 100  100 
Signal/Noise Ratio  0.20 0.15 0.17  0.52 
     
Indicator  1 1 1  3 
Total Infrastructure  25 25 25  25 
Weighting Factor  0.0039 0.0039 0.0039  0.0039 
     
Technology Detection 
Share  0.1% 0.1% 0.1%  0.2% 
Table 6. Calculation of  Detection Impact 
Table 7 is an example Weighting Factor Calculation, given an actor with a /24 





Weight of Indicator          
   IPs  Machines  Accounts 
Available  256 20 2 
Weighting Factor  0.004 0.025 0.500 
Table 7. Calculation of Weighting Factor 
 5. Summary 
The Detection Impact metric rewards high true positives and penalizes false 
negatives, allowing defenders to compare technologies across various levels of the 
security stack. For example, an IDS detecting 50% true positives, but which enumerates 
20% of available actor IP space, has a 50% X 20% = 10% impact on the actor’s ability to 
complete their mission. Conversely, a host-based AV with 90% true positive rate, but 
which misses 1 of 10 malicious artifacts has a 90% X 10% = 9% impact on the actor’s 
operation. This metric can also inform cyber defenders where they can optimize their 
impact on the attackers—for example, using IP lists to block APT activity, or playing 
“whack-a-mole” with an IP block list, will not have much impact. However, hardening 
hosts and updating defensive signatures could potentially have a significant effect on an 
actor using commodity malware, by preventing or alerting on 100% of infected systems. 
This would present a high yield mitigation step in the cyber kill chain. Thus, in addition 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA GATHERING PROOF OF 
CONCEPT 
A. FRAMEWORK FOR ONE OR TWO-PLAYER EXERCISE 
 Overview: 
In order to demonstrate how these metrics are measured, I created a small battle 
environment to conduct an exercise. The steps in this exercise fall into common 
methodology steps, and the network under attack retained its functionality throughout the 
exercise, hence satisfying the requirements listed in the previous chapter. This exercise 
modeled the exfiltration of data from an internal Windows environment. It incorporates 
scanning, exploitation—both outside in and client side—password cracking, lateral 
movement, and exfiltration.  
For the purposes of this exercise, each machine involved represents a different 
“segment” of an enterprise network: 
Host/ User Machine: Internal network 
Web Server: DMZ 
Windows 2003 Server: Enterprise Infrastructure 
Kali Linux: Evil Internet 
Security Onion: Security Infrastructure (Security Onion, 2014)1 
Assumptions: 
Footprinting: Because this was a single-user exercise, executed by myself, I 
bypassed the “Footprinting” stage. Since I built the entire exercise, it was impossible to 
not know the configurations or details of the blue network. A proper Footprinting step is 





Flat Network:  
While it is possible to include a virtual router and/or firewall into the single user 
exercise, this exercise assumes a “flat” network. Because each machine in this exercise is 
representative of an enterprise segment, there was no functional need for a router, as 














1. Scan Network 
2. Exploit Web Server  
3. Client Side Exploit of Windows XP machine 
4. Hashdump/ Password crack to get Domain credentials 
5. Move laterally to internal Windows server 
6. Exfiltrate data 
7. Cover Tracks 
Security Onion Windows XP Windows 2003 ServerMetasploitable Web Server
Kali Linux
Figure 2. Single or Dual User Exercise Topology 
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Defensive Functionality Requirements: 
1. Keep all machines up 
2. Freeze IDS and AV signature updates 
3. Cannot block subnets 
 
Hardware/Software Used 
I used three physical computers, mostly due to storage and performance concerns. 
I connected them with a hub and CAT5 Ethernet cables, and kept them air-gapped from 
any other network connections. 
Hardware: Dell Laptop running Host OS of Kali Linux (Offensive Security Ltd., 
2014)2  
Dell Laptop running Virtualized windows environment (Internal network) 
o Windows Server (DNS/ Active Directory/ Email) 
o Windows Host 
Dell laptop running virtualized Linux environment (DMZ) 
o Metasploitable (Rapid7, 2012) (web server) 
o Security Onion (IDS) 
- Ethernet hub with 4 network interfaces 
- 3 CAT5 Ethernet cables 
 
Defensive Tools: 
- Intrusion Detection System - Security Onion 
- Network Traffic: Wireshark 
- Host Anti Virus—Avast Free AV 
- Host Event Logs—Windows Events, Linux var/log 
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Offensive Tools: 
- Main Interface: Armitage/ Metasploit 
- Exploit Package Development: Social Engineering Toolkit 
- Scanner: Nmap 
- Password Cracker: John the Ripper (Johnny) 
 
B. PROCESS/ RESULTS 
Using the Kali Linux machine, I began a Metasploit database and started 
Armitage. This allowed for a graphic depiction of the attack, as well as a good place to 





Figure 3.  Mapping the Network 
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Phase 1: Scanning:  
First step was to scan the /24 network housing the webserver and other machines 
in the network. For this I used Nmap within Armitage. 
Enumeration: Upon scanning the Metasploitable web server, I (as expected) found 
several vulnerable programs. Armitage allows for a “Find Attacks” option, which 
examines the scan information for possible exploits. 
Note: The exploitation of a Metasploitable server is neither difficult nor unique in 
nature. The use of this well-known vulnerable VM was to facilitate the exercise, not to 
demonstrate offensive expertise. Unfortunately, real-world anecdotes often reveal 
systems similarly vulnerable, so it is not out of the question that such a server might be 
running in the wild. 
 
Phase 2: Exploitation:  
Using Armitage, I then executed a “Hail Mary” against the server, to see what 
exploits would work and which sessions I could begin. Sure enough, 4 sessions opened, 
Figure 4. Sessions Started on Web Server 
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with varying privileges, as seen in Figure 4. 
Lateral Movement: Once a session was established with the Metasploitable server, 
I sought to make my next move in the methodology—move laterally to the windows 
domain. To do this, I created an embedded .pdf executable using the Social Engineering 
Toolkit (SET): Once the executable was constructed, I used a session from Metasploit to 
upload the executable to the var/www/ directory of the Metasploitable web server, as 
shown in Figure 5. 
Client-Side Exploitation (Maintain Access): The next step assumes a social 
engineering success to have someone in the Windows domain access the pdf on the 
Metasploitable web server. I felt comfortable making this assumption because this is not 
only a common social engineering tactic, but in this scenario the web server and 




Figure 5.  Uploading the Exploit PDF 
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On the Kali Linux machine, I began a listener on port 443. I coded this port as a 
callback on the pdf executable because it is commonly allowed out on most internal 
networks. Once the pdf was downloaded by a victim on the web server, it immediately 
executes and calls back to the attacking computer. Now that I had access to the windows 
domain, I performed an “arp –a” command on the XP host to see what other computers it 
was talking to. The arp sweep revealed the Windows server.  
Moving Laterally: Additionally, while on the XP machine, I performed a dump of 
all the stored credentials, using the “hashdump” meterpreter command. Once I had the 
hashes, I set about cracking them using John the Ripper with the default wordlist that 
came with the Kali Linux build. Once the Administrator password had been cracked, I 
sought to map to a share within the Windows domain to simulate lateral movement. I 
used the net view/ net use commands, authenticating to the Windows server as 
Administrator. This is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Phase 3: Exfiltration:  
Once I had successfully mapped the drive, I could explore the file system through 
meterpreter, and download the secret file, as shown in Figure 7. 
Cover Tracks: Finally, to cover my tracks, I used the “clear event log” function 
within the meterpreter shell, on the XP host. Additionally, I wrote ““ to the var/log/syslog 
file on the Metasploitable server. I was unable to wipe logs on the Windows server, 






Figure 6.  Mapping Network Drive 
Figure 7.  View/ Exfiltrate Sensitive Information 
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C. MONITORING/ GATHERING STATISTICS 
On the blue team side, there were several places to gather both live and after-the-
fact statistics on the attack. I wanted to be sure that these tools would indeed gather alerts, 
and also examine the data to indeed see if the statistics were viable and sensible. 
Network Technology:  
 
The security onion VM served as a useful, if somewhat finicky, IDS alert 
platform. Security Onion provides a wealth of different IDS and PCAP technologies; I 





Figure 8.  IDS Alerts 
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Network IDS Technology Evaluation: 
The following calculations were performed to calculate the Detection Impact of 
the IDS technology. There were 97 total alerts from scanning, revealing the attacker IP 
address. Additionally, a total of 6 alerts fired on exploitation, covering 2 of the 4 exploits 
launched. 
 
   IP Address 1  Exploit 1  Exploit 2  Total 
True Positive  97  4 2 101 
Total Alerts  174  174 174 174 
Detection Rate  0.56  0.02 0.01 0.58 
     
Indicator  1  1 1   
Total Infrastructure  256  4 4   
Weighting Factor  0.0039  0.2500 0.2500 0.1680 
     
Detection Impact  0.2%  0.6% 0.3% 9.7% 
Table 8.  Calculation of IDS Detection Impact 
Host- Based Technology Evaluation: 
I installed Avast! Free Anti-Virus on the XP host. While it alerted on the initial 
pdf exploit and another malicious .pdf file I uploaded, (as seen in Figure 9), it did not 
alert on a persistence agent uploaded after a session had been established. This speaks to 
the low false positive rate of Anti-Virus solution—but also the false negative rate. In fact, 
Symantec recently reported that they estimate their AV solution only catches 45% of 
current cyber attacks (Yadron, 2014). In comparison to the IDS, the Detection Impact 


















   Artifact 1  Artifact 2  Artifact 3  Total 
True Positive  4 3 0  4
Total Alerts  7 7 7  7
Detection Rate  0.57 0.43 0.00  0.57
     
Unique Indicator  1 1 1    
Total Infrastructure Type  3 3 3    
Weighting Factor  0.3333 0.3333 0.3333  0.3333
     
Detection Impact  19.0% 14.3% 0.0%  33.3%
Table 9. Calculation of Avast Detection Impact 
To elaborate on this metric, the reason why the AV solution had a higher 
Detection Impact is primarily because had AV alerted on all three artifacts, and assuming 
rapid or immediate mitigation had been taken against them, I as the adversary would have 
been effectively blocked from my mission.  
Summary:  
The Detection Impact metric was intended to provide a platform-agnostic measure 
of a technology’s ability to provide a blue team with a full, clear picture of malicious 
actor’s presence on the network. While the metric may not account for technological 
externalities or extreme cases, it can be used to compare detection technologies at the 
Figure 9. Avast! AV Alerts 
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network, domain, and host levels. If the aggregate score of a security stack approaches 1, 
then the Blue Team is in a position to effectively block the actors from success in their 
mission. In the examples of the Single-User Exercise, the Detection Impact metric did 
indeed land between 0 and 1 for both IDS and AV, and provided comparable values of 
9.7% and 33.3%, respectively. 
D. EXTENSIONS TO CLASSROOM EXERCISE 
Building off the basics of the small exercise, a classroom exercise can be built 
with similar principles, with more machines, more technologies, and thus more 
opportunities for evaluation. Instead of single machines representing the Attacker, DMZ, 
and Internal Network, more machines can be placed into segments, better simulating a 
real enterprise network. An example of what a classroom exercise might look like is in 
Figure 10. 
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 Overview:  
Essentially, the exercise should preserve the concepts and methodology of initial 
compromise, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and exfiltration. This methodology 
resembles real-world activity, and will also help make sense of the statistical data 
gathered. If the exercise were extended to the classroom environment and with a larger 
network, the methodology could look like the below: 
1. Scan Network 
a. Can scan the whole network, or just DMZ. Additionally, 
Red Team can switch/spoof IPs 
2. Exploit Web Server  
Figure 10. Classroom Exercise Topology 
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a. There should be several servers in the DMZ. Web server 
could form an initial point of entry, but DNS and/or Email 
could also be leveraged. 
3. Client Side Exploit of Windows XP machine 
a. This could take several forms. In my example, I pushed a 
malicious file to the webserver—but a spear-phishing 
attack or other abuse of trusted relationships between the 
DMZ and internal network could be used. 
4. Hashdump/ Password crack to get Domain credentials 
a. This could entail compromise of a domain controller, rather 
than simple password cracking; however, cracking hashes 
or pass-the-hash remain relatively simple ways to achieve 
the same goal. 
5. Move laterally to internal Windows server 
a. Since there are several servers, this can be expanded to 
include a file server or database. 
6. Exfiltrate data 
a. Rather than a direct download through a shell, a classroom 
exercise could incorporate an internal blue network FTP 
server as a pivot point. 
7. Cover Tracks—This could potentially involve data deletion, or 
centralized logging corruption—depending on the scope of the 
exercise. 
Timing:  
The three phased approach in the single/dual user exercise worked well, allowing 
me to perform Red Team functions, stop, and then examine the Blue Team detection 
tools for alerts and information. Therefore, the proposed timing of the classroom exercise 
is to break the exercise into three phases as well. However, these phases are further split 
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into “innings,” alternating activity between teams in order to objectively measure the 
effectiveness of the team, tools, and tactics. 
 


























Table 10. Classroom Exercise Phases 
Hacking Back:  
For the purposes of this exercise, “hacking back,” that is, offensive activities 
undertaken by the blue team, are not allowed. The reason in this case is that in a “hack 
back” scenario, the offensive blue team’s objective is not data exfiltration but rather 
destruction and disruption. While in a wartime scenario, this may apply, in economic 
espionage cases it represents a fundamentally separate paradigm. 
 
Additional Modules to Consider: 
Security Team Under Surveillance: In Phase 2, the Red team gains visibility on 
the security devices and actions of the Blue team. 
Destructive Payload: In Phase 3, the red team destroys or deletes data as a final 
step, rather than exfiltration. It is important for assessment purposes that records be 
copied by the white team before this action, in order to ensure historical data is not 
deleted as part of the exercise itself. 
DDoS as a distraction: During any of the phases, DDoS could be used by the Red 
Team to distract or disrupt Blue Team operations in the midst of the exercise. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
Executing the single-user/ dual user exercise, and recording statistics while doing 
so, illuminated many lessons about how statistics might be gathered in a classroom 
setting. Additionally, the various different iterations of systems that needed to be created, 
destroyed, and created again made it clear that these statistics should be general, not 
specific to any given technology. They must also be specific enough to highlight attacker 
and defensive weaknesses at every stage of the exercise. 
Given the technical effort involved in full statistical capture for the single-user 
exercise, the classroom exercise could become prohibitively complicated if not properly 
scoped and planned. In order to gather meaningful statistics, there must be a solid 
understanding of security device configuration, visibility, and output in order to 
objectively measure its effectiveness. Additionally, while maintaining an authoritative 
timeline and a compendium of statistics is a hard task, it must be a priority for the white 
cell. 
Cyber defense technologies often involve complicated and obscure commands, 
interfaces, and terms. While it may be easy to blame the opaqueness of a tool’s output on 
the user, there is something to be said for ease of usability and interpretation. If a tool 
requires months or years of training, then the investment for that tool is far higher than 
the sticker price. Therefore, while missed alerts or indicators may technically be due to a 
blue team’s lack of skill, tools which require extensive training will be scored lower than 
easy-to-use tools.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
While measuring a technology’s ability to detect actor tools and infrastructure is a 
fair measure, that knowledge is no good if a blue team cannot remove malicious access in 
time. Statistics must be tested to measure the time it takes for a blue team to translate 
alert data into indicators, and indicators into mitigations.  
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Time-Based Statistics:  
Theory: If a mitigation action is taken to remove actor access after the actor has 
already achieved their mission, there is little point. The important thing from a cyber 
defense perspective is to operate inside the operation loop of the adversary. Thus, the 
grand measure of success or failure is whether or not alerts yielded indicators, and 
indicators precipitated mitigations, fast enough to affect the adversary’s goals.  
Implementation: Each phase of the exercise is evaluated on time of first alert, to 
time of first indicator submitted, to time of first mitigation put in place. This measures 
people and processes ability to analyze alert information, gain confidence in indicators, 
and then implement mitigations. Thus, the time from first alert to mitigation, as compared 
to first contact to mission completion, is the measure of the effectiveness of a process or 
personnel during an exercise. 
The below statistics could potentially be used to measure the team’s timely or 
untimely performance—measuring reaction to information, ability to adapt, quality of 
detection, and other qualities which apply to the human components of red and blue 

















Table 11.  Time-Based Statistics 
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Mitigation- Based Statistics: 
It is imperative that the blue team keep track of what mitigations are put in place, 
and when. This is critical to recognizing which mitigations had the most effect on the 






Table 12.  Mitigation Statistics 
For each mitigation (Indicator Submitter, Layer of Mitigation, Time of Submission), the 
timeliness can be viewed using the following approach 
 
Mitigation Timeliness: For Each Mitigations M which is informed by Alerts A1, 
A2, A3, etc containing Indicators I1, I2, I3, etc: 
 
Average [(Time from First Alert A1 to Mitigation M1—(Time from First Contact to 
Exfiltration)] / (Time from First Contact to Exfiltration) 
Equation 6.  Mitigation Timeliness 






Rather than simply evaluating technology, these metrics can be used to evaluate 
processes and technology—namely, room for improvement. That can justify a need to 
devote resources to procedure development and practice, or training for Incident 
Response Personnel to more quickly turn alerts to indicators and indicators to mitigations. 
While not as discrete as the metrics for technology implementation, they can provide a 
good measure of which processes are most important to focus on, or which areas of a 
team or procedure need improvement. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In order for the concept of exercises as sources of statistics to help cyber 
modeling efforts, cyber exercises need to adopt more robust statistical gathering 
mechanisms, and share them openly with the community. This paper has demonstrated 
the need for and means by which these statistics can be generated and integrated into 
existing models. These are first attempts; it is my hope that better and more elegant 
manners of translation are built and executed. 
Secondly, it is imperative that there be a clearinghouse of these statistics, and that 
they be made public for everyone’s consumption. These statistics will gain accuracy as 
the sample size grows. It is possible, for example, to publish the single user exercise and 
let people submit their own statistics with verification from a third party. If the data is 
crowd-sourced in that manner, it could gain traction in the community and help to build a 
Figure 11.  Mitigation Timeline 
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much larger data set of attack and defense stats. Additionally, if classroom Red/Blue 
exercises track statistics properly, that data can be incorporated into the larger community. 
If properly indexed and categorized, this data could finally solve the lack of operational 
data that cyber security research suffers from. 
Finally, cyber security researchers must use this data to build and test cost and 
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